EU's strategy for Africa: The systems are in place, now Africa needs proof
By Toby Vogel - Thursday, November 04, 2010
What matters is not who draws up the EU's strategy for Africa, but whether the plan links development and foreign policy goals.
Next Wednesday, the European Commission will launch a consultation paper on the direction of the EU's development policy. On the same day (10 November), it will present proposals to strengthen relations with Africa, ahead of a summit in Libya with the 53 nations of the African Union in late November.
On both matters Andris Piebalgs, the European commissioner for development, will take the lead.
This reflects how the EU's policy to Africa has been handled in the past. That traditional approach is not unreasonable: the EU's relations with Africa are overwhelmingly driven by the continent's massive development needs. And improving the impact of aid – the focus of the consultation paper – has become even more important, because the global economic crisis has led to cuts to aid budgets and because the world is falling far short of its Millennium Development Goals.
But it is nonetheless odd for a development commissioner to take the lead on forming the policy of Europe's strategic partnership with another continent. It is a bit like outsourcing the EU's Russia policy to Günther Oettinger, the European commissioner for energy, or its east-Asia policy to Karel De Gucht, the European commissioner for trade.
This is the type of oddity that the restructuring of the EU's foreign-policy apparatus was supposed to remove.
Indeed, the Commission's country specialists who drafted the bulk of the Africa strategy will themselves be affected by the restructuring: they will be transferred in January to the EU's new European External Action Service (EEAS).
So, is the presentation of the Africa strategy by Piebalgs, rather than by Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief who oversees the EEAS, symbolic of a failing on the part of the EU's fledgling foreign-policy system?
It is too early to say that. In practical terms, the decision was reasonable. The EEAS has yet to be launched – and so the officials who drafted the Africa strategy still sit next to those who drafted the development paper, in Piebalgs's department for development. Nor is it a political problem: it is unlikely that European and African leaders care which service drafted the document they will discuss at their summit.
But the symbolism would be cause for concern if Ashton were relegating Africa, by delegating strategy to Piebalgs, and if the two of them failed to produce a common and coherent strategy.
The initial signs are positive. Ashton decided early in her tenure that one of her priorities would be the Horn of Africa, the continent's most dangerous region (this from a woman often criticised for lacking an interest in military matters). This prioritisation is understandable: insecurity in the Horn of Africa has effects far beyond the region, most immediately by driving up the cost of shipping through the Suez Canal.
She also made a qualitative change in the EU's approach to the Horn of Africa. When she took up office, naval anti-piracy missions by the EU and NATO had been effective enough – but it was clear that they would not root out piracy as long as anarchy reigned onshore. The launch this spring of a military training mission for Somali government forces in Uganda was, therefore, a logical next step. It was, though, also high-risk, since the EU had now taken sides in Somalia's civil war, as had the African Union (AU) before it.
But, looking beyond Somalia, this focus on strengthening the institutions of government is fundamentally sound. Most of Africa's states have been chron-ically weak since gaining independence. Many Africans have suffered under tyranny and many more are being held back by an overbearing state. Neither are indicators of a strong state; they are, rather, indicators of weak institutions.
Piebalgs shares the focus on governance. He understands better than many foreign policy experts that the EU's relations with Africa must not be reduced to development issues. What Africa needs, as Piebalgs has stressed repeatedly, is less ‘classic' aid, which is often a palliative, and more aid that generates equitable – in his wording, “inclusive” – growth. For that to happen, countries and regions need stability, sound public administration and accountable government.
Ahead of the presentation of the strategy, the principal question is there-fore not whether Ashton is indifferent to Africa (she is not), but whether the two commissioners have managed to join up policies related to Africa to help create the preconditions for stronger institutions and equitable growth.
Outsiders will find inherent limits to what they can achieve. And this is where another principle underpinning the EU's Africa strategy comes in: it is supposed to be a joint EU-AU strategy for Africa. The current joint strategy, adopted by the two sides in 2007, has not delivered on its ambitions – but it has made a start and provided a structure to assess where the problems lie.
The EU's development bits and its foreign policy bits will soon be better connected. The links between the EU and the AU are deepening. Piebalgs and Ashton now need to show that their thinking is joined-up, and EU and AU leaders need to match their stated ambitions.
Source: EuropeanVoice via Hiram
What matters is not who draws up the EU's strategy for Africa, but whether the plan links development and foreign policy goals.
Next Wednesday, the European Commission will launch a consultation paper on the direction of the EU's development policy. On the same day (10 November), it will present proposals to strengthen relations with Africa, ahead of a summit in Libya with the 53 nations of the African Union in late November.
On both matters Andris Piebalgs, the European commissioner for development, will take the lead.
This reflects how the EU's policy to Africa has been handled in the past. That traditional approach is not unreasonable: the EU's relations with Africa are overwhelmingly driven by the continent's massive development needs. And improving the impact of aid – the focus of the consultation paper – has become even more important, because the global economic crisis has led to cuts to aid budgets and because the world is falling far short of its Millennium Development Goals.
But it is nonetheless odd for a development commissioner to take the lead on forming the policy of Europe's strategic partnership with another continent. It is a bit like outsourcing the EU's Russia policy to Günther Oettinger, the European commissioner for energy, or its east-Asia policy to Karel De Gucht, the European commissioner for trade.
This is the type of oddity that the restructuring of the EU's foreign-policy apparatus was supposed to remove.
Indeed, the Commission's country specialists who drafted the bulk of the Africa strategy will themselves be affected by the restructuring: they will be transferred in January to the EU's new European External Action Service (EEAS).
So, is the presentation of the Africa strategy by Piebalgs, rather than by Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief who oversees the EEAS, symbolic of a failing on the part of the EU's fledgling foreign-policy system?
It is too early to say that. In practical terms, the decision was reasonable. The EEAS has yet to be launched – and so the officials who drafted the Africa strategy still sit next to those who drafted the development paper, in Piebalgs's department for development. Nor is it a political problem: it is unlikely that European and African leaders care which service drafted the document they will discuss at their summit.
But the symbolism would be cause for concern if Ashton were relegating Africa, by delegating strategy to Piebalgs, and if the two of them failed to produce a common and coherent strategy.
The initial signs are positive. Ashton decided early in her tenure that one of her priorities would be the Horn of Africa, the continent's most dangerous region (this from a woman often criticised for lacking an interest in military matters). This prioritisation is understandable: insecurity in the Horn of Africa has effects far beyond the region, most immediately by driving up the cost of shipping through the Suez Canal.
She also made a qualitative change in the EU's approach to the Horn of Africa. When she took up office, naval anti-piracy missions by the EU and NATO had been effective enough – but it was clear that they would not root out piracy as long as anarchy reigned onshore. The launch this spring of a military training mission for Somali government forces in Uganda was, therefore, a logical next step. It was, though, also high-risk, since the EU had now taken sides in Somalia's civil war, as had the African Union (AU) before it.
But, looking beyond Somalia, this focus on strengthening the institutions of government is fundamentally sound. Most of Africa's states have been chron-ically weak since gaining independence. Many Africans have suffered under tyranny and many more are being held back by an overbearing state. Neither are indicators of a strong state; they are, rather, indicators of weak institutions.
Piebalgs shares the focus on governance. He understands better than many foreign policy experts that the EU's relations with Africa must not be reduced to development issues. What Africa needs, as Piebalgs has stressed repeatedly, is less ‘classic' aid, which is often a palliative, and more aid that generates equitable – in his wording, “inclusive” – growth. For that to happen, countries and regions need stability, sound public administration and accountable government.
Ahead of the presentation of the strategy, the principal question is there-fore not whether Ashton is indifferent to Africa (she is not), but whether the two commissioners have managed to join up policies related to Africa to help create the preconditions for stronger institutions and equitable growth.
Outsiders will find inherent limits to what they can achieve. And this is where another principle underpinning the EU's Africa strategy comes in: it is supposed to be a joint EU-AU strategy for Africa. The current joint strategy, adopted by the two sides in 2007, has not delivered on its ambitions – but it has made a start and provided a structure to assess where the problems lie.
The EU's development bits and its foreign policy bits will soon be better connected. The links between the EU and the AU are deepening. Piebalgs and Ashton now need to show that their thinking is joined-up, and EU and AU leaders need to match their stated ambitions.
Source: EuropeanVoice via Hiram